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Abstract. . Amongst the challenging problems that must be addressed in order
to create increasingly automated electronic commerce systems are those which
involve forming coalitions of agents to exploit a particular market opportunity.
Furthermore  economic  systems are  normally continuous  dynamic  systems  –
generating many instances of the same or similar problems (the regular calls for
tender, regular emergence of new markets etc.).The work described in this pa-
per explores how simple forms of memory can be exploited by agents over time
to guide decision making in iterative sequences of coalition formation problems
– enabling them to build up social knowledge in order to improve their own
utility  and  the  ability  of  the  population  to  produce  increasingly well  suited
coalitions for a simple call-for-tender economy.
1 Introduction 
Among the challenging problems which must be tackled in order to realise some types
of Agent Mediated Electronic Systems is the well known coalition-formation problem
[Kraus97] – given the emergence of a business opportunity (such as a new market, a
government call for tender, a contracting opportunity or a product niche) which com-
panies or individuals could/should work together to best fill this niche – generating
profit for themselves and utility for the market environment as a whole? 
This problem generally does not just  occur  once in a given environment, it  seems
likely that many systems will be characterised by populations of agents representing
different corporations  regularly  bidding/competing  for new continuously  emerging
opportunities.  As in human mediated systems it  seems highly likely therefore,  that
alongside individual considerations for solving a particular coalition formation task,
(for a particular call for tender or market for example) social structures within the
population (such as who knows who, knowledge of past performance, existing obliga-
tions and so forth) which emerge over time will play a major role. 
The aim of this paper is to take a simple model of a an iterative commercial world
where a population of agents regularly need to form consortia to address new market
opportunities and demonstrate simple decision making strategies based on learning
between episodes can be exploited to make coalition choices.
Specifically, the paper defines a simple call-for-tender economy based on the iterative
coalition worlds described in [Merida04] and explores how agents can exploit two
types of information to assist themselves over time:  
- Information about past performance – a simple form of society wide reputa-
tion. 
- Information on previous shared mutual success or failure – a simple form of
memory.
Next section defines the world and models applied, Section 3 the experiments Experi-
mental setup and results are provided in Section 4. Sections 5 -7 add analysis and dis-
cussion of implications / properties of the model and strategies as well as how they
relates to existing work in coalition formation, game theory and a number of other
areas.
2 Problem Definition and Models
Taking the Iterative Coalition Formation problem defined in [Merida04], a coalition
formation problem ([Sandholm99, Klusch02]) can be defined at its simplest as:
 - Given a population P of agents and a list of tasks or goals T.
- Select subgroups of agents S1, S2, S3, … of P to address each of the tasks in
T. 
A variety of problems then address the properties of the subgroups (stability, maxim-
um social welfare, pareto efficiency, etc.), their behaviour (how any payoff is split or
how the coalition is maintained to complete the task) and how the coalitions can come
into  being  (the  amount  of  information  available,  whether  agents  are  cooperative,
whether agents can be part of multiple coalitions and so forth). In particular the coali-
tion formation problem deals with the process of finding a set of combinations of
agents which best solve given tasks in a given problem episode T (on set of tasks) for
a given population of agents. From now on defined as a single coalition game.
Iterated coalition formation extends this notion by drawing the literature of  iterated
games used in game theory to lead to an iterative sequence of coalition games:
- Given  a  population  P of  agents  and  an  iterated  sequence  of  lists  of
tasks/goals T1, T2, T3, ….
- Let each task Ti correspond to a single coalition game Gi.
- Select for that Gi subgroups of agents Si1, Si2, Si3, … of P to address each of
the tasks in Ti. 
Intuitively this means that a population of agents persists over time to experience a
series of coalition games – one after the other.1 Applying such a system to the analogy
of an agent mediated electronic economy: 
- Agents represent companies active in a particular domain.
- Public bodies or other corporations issue calls for tender which require one
or more companies to resolve – the tasks in the environment.
- Agents can work together in consortia (the subgroups in the environment) to
bid for the contract to address these tasks. 
- Tasks may be static (similar tasks occurring regularly) or dynamic (changing
over time).
Another formulation could map Tasks to the creation of products to market niches
(e.g. yearly demand for new fashion items). Other analogies could be for agents rep-
resenting freelance contractors (combining to bid for small tenders), agents represent-
ing software developers (combining to develop products for emerging market niches)
or  large  corporations  combining  to  create  new consumer  devices  for  new market
niches.
In many of these cases it is highly unlikely that the whole coalition formation and in-
teraction process would be managed automatically by agents (since there are many
1  An obvious generalisation of this are continuous coalition formation problems where prob-
lems may occur at any time, have durations and may overlap in time – hence removing the
step wise / discrete nature of the iterative model.
factors involved), however the system described here outlines the basic form of the
problem and provides a framework for what might be at least partial decision support
systems.
3 Game Setup 
The world described in the previous section allows us to create a coalition game envir-
onment in which agents apply a range of strategies. The environment could be almost
arbitrarily complex depending on the precise rules of the world, the nature of the tasks
/ Agent skills as well as the information / actions available to agents. Further complex-
ity factors include whether the population of agents is allowed to change over time,
whether the skills of individuals could change and what restrictions there are on coali-
tions (such as their size and payoff division within coalitions). 
Due to this complexity, the world explored here is simplified to keep both experiment
execution and analysis feasible. In particular:
- Experiments are a series of 500 individual coalition formation episodes –
each characterized by a single call-for-tender that agents may form coalitions
to bid for.
- Only one winning coalition is selected each around according to the function
given in Box 1. (Intuitively this function picks the best coalition which meets
all criteria OR if there is no such coalition the best coalition overall.)
- Only the winning coalition is awarded with a fixed sum payoff each round
and this is assumed split evenly between the members of the winning coali-
tion. 
- Agents have no knowledge of each others skills, neither is there a centralized
matchmaking system which helps cluster agents based on their skills – skills
are only seen/evaluated by the tendering agency at bid evaluation time and
not shared.
- Agents only have knowledge of past successes and failures (their own and
those shared with others in previous coalitions) and of which agents in the
population win at each turn (publicly announced information).
- The number of agents in the population is fixed (agents cannot join or leave
the system between rounds) and skills are assigned randomly at the beginning
of the iterative sequence – staying fixed across all games.
- The maximum number of agents in a coalition is set at 6 and the number of
agents in the world at 102 (a multiple of 6 for convenience) in the experi-
ments carried out here.
- In some experiments the task issued each round may be fixed (randomly gen-
erated initially) and in some it may change over time (see Section 4.3).
In this context in each round agents find themselves in a particular coalition (in the
first round this is a unitary coalition with only themselves) and can exercise only one
choice: whether to Stay in the current coalition for the next game, or leave and join
another. 
- A task t is  fulfilled by a coalition C if the value for all the skills in  t, is less than or equal to the
maximum value among the members of C for the same skill.
- For a coalition C which fulfils t the surplus of C is the sum of all the skills in the task with value>0
of the difference among the maximum skill value of an agent in the coalition and the required skill
value of the task 
- For a coalition which does not fulfil t, the deficit of C is defined as the subtraction of de difference
among the maximum skill value in the coalition and the skill value for all the skills required in the
task.
- The winner is chosen as: A) if there is a coalition that fulfils the task is the coalition with maximum
surplus, or B) if there is no coalition that fulfils the task is the coalition with minimum deficit
Box 1: Winner determination function per game.
Agents which leave coalitions in any given round are randomly ordered and one after
the other allowed to select which existing coalition they would like to join (excluding
coalitions which already have (6 members) or (with a random probability) whether to
form a new coalition. Hence at the end of every round agents which leave are again
clustered into a new set of coalitions.
Although this generates  a  relatively simple world (bounding coalition size bounds
complexity for example [Fiaschi04] and agents have seemingly simple choices), the
system still exhibits significant complexity: coalitions are partially instantiated at each
turn (not allowing full reorganization), knowledge builds up in a complex manner (de-
pending on which agents have been thrown together with others) and the number of
possible coalitions is very large even in a small system (for 102 agents with size 6
maximum coalition size the number of combinations is approximately 1.3 billion – for
size m in a population of n agents the value is a binomial number [n,m]).
3.1 Agent strategies
In this world,  agents therefore need to apply strategies to decide when the stay or
leave their current coalition. In this paper we consider just two simple strategies: 
- Local Memory Agents (LMA)  : Agents keep track of which agents they have
previously worked  with in  coalition  and  apply a  Reinforcement  Learning
(RL) mechanism (see section 3.2) to raise assign/track positive or negative
feeling (called affinity from now on) for other agents based on whether previ-
ous collaboration lead to a positive or negative result.
- Global Memory Agents (GMA)  : The agent is aware of who is playing the
game, and uses a similar RL mechanism increase/decrease the affinity for
those agents known (publicly announced) as being in the winning coalition in
each round.
Hence in both cases agents track previous results in the world – however in the former
they remember their own interactions with others and in the later they remember glob-
al  indicators  of  success  (independent  of  whether  or  not  they themselves  were  in-
volved).
For both strategies, the decision of staying or leaving the coalition is taken in the basis
of the “affinities” observed in the following way:
 )(),,( XYYXLeave
Formula 1: Function to decide whether to stay or leave the current coalition
Where X stands for the sum of the affinity towards the members of the agent’s current
coalition and Y stands for the average affinity that the agent could have in case she de-
cides to leave the current coalition. Y is calculated as the mean of the affinities that
belong to the players outside the agent’s coalition multiplied by the maximum coali-
tion size.2 Delta is a factor that models the degree of willingness of moving to possible
profitable coalitions. A delta equal to 0 will mean that the agent will stay in the current
coalition unless the possibilities outside of it look better than in the current coalition, a
positive delta means that the agent will stay even though there may be better perspect-
ives outside (up to a certain threshold). Negative delta means that the agent is willing
to leave the current coalition even if the expectations outside are worst conditions ob-
served outside her current coalition.
3.2 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement Learning is used both to determine whether to stay or leave and as a
mechanism for deciding where to go in the case of deciding to leave. Each agent main-
tains a data structure that stores information about the rest of agents in the game (repu-
tation information for  GMA, and affinity for  LMA). Initially all  the agents  in the
structure have an initial score Init. When the agent decides to reward or punish anoth-
er agent a fixed amount FixInc  and FixDec  is added or subtracted respectively. The
sum of the scores of agents in the structure is a constant, so each time a set of agents
are rewarded, the amount to concede to them is subtracted evenly from the rest of
agents. In the same way, when an agent/s is/are punished, the amount of penalty is
shared from the rest of agents. The values that scores of agents can have are bounded
from MaxBound to MinBound.
4 Experiments 
The following sections describe a set of experiments designed to better help under-
stand the environment, in particular- given limited information and strategies avail-
able:
2  Note that both X and Y are approximation since A) some members of the current coalition
may leave and new individuals join and B) given that if it leaves the agent has some choice
of where to move to (depending on its random place in the order of choices) the final affinity
with the new coalition may be slightly higher than Y.
- Which strategies are dominant? If any?
- How do different strategies interact?
- Which strategies lead to better global solutions and/or faster convergence to
good solutions in the overall population?
Experiments are initiated by generating a population of agents with a random distribu-
tion of skills and a task with random corresponding requirements. Each agent in the
environment is assigned one of the basic strategies described previously (LMA, GMA
or random as a control) as well as a DELTA threshold value. Experiment runs cover
500 coalition episodes – after each of which a winning coalition is designated, agents
update their learned data and make new coalition changes. In most experiments the
task remains fixed, experiments where the task changes are covered in Section 4.3.
The following parameters are fixed here: 1) Number of agents in the game to 102. (di-
visible number by the maximum coalition size). 2) maximum coalition size to 6 mem-
bers.  3) Highly irregular distribution uniformity of the skills in the population and
tasks (skill points far from being evenly distributed among the skills) 4) N1 is set with
value 100 and N2 is set with value 300. 5) The number of different skills Sk is set to
10. In the reinforcement learning mechanism 6) the initial value Init  to 0, and 7) the
bounds MaxBound and MinBound to 1 and -1 respectively, finally 7) the DELTA val-
ues used parameter in the RL mechanism for both types of agents were -0.5, -0.2 , 0,
0.2 and 0.5. Those different setups of delta are noted in the experiments as the suffixes
--, -, 0, + and ++ respectively.
Each combination of populations / setup was tested 20 times with different random
populations. For the last set of experiments (Dynamic Environment) the task was var-
ied over time regularly each 10 or each 50 rounds.
4.1 Pure Populations
The first set of experiments carried out was to assess the performance each strategy by
itself. Each population was run with 20 experiments and the behaviour observed. Al-
most all populations showed a significant turnover in winning coalitions over time
with a steady increase in the quality of solutions. This is shown in Figure 1 which
plots the sums of the distance from optimal (Smith’s Alpha value [Smith62]) for each
population type.
In the graph lower means better as coalitions evolved in the population that got very
close to the optimum coalitions possible in the populations (calculated separately us-
ing a brute method). The results show:
- A significant advantage for LMA Populations over GMA populations.
- A small but significant difference between the performances of LMA by us-
ing different DELTAS in that whilst LMA zero performs best, LMA+ and
LMA++ performs very nearly as well but LMA- and LMA-- perform worse
than the three of them: creating a sequence 0, +, ++, -, --.
- The reverse is true for GMA agents that also perform best around zero, but
GMA- outperforms GMA+ (with GMA+, GMA++ performing very poorly).
- GMA+ and GMA++ population performing worst of all  (even worst than
random)
- Random choice populations performing poorly - showing that  all  learning
based strategies (except GMA+ and GMA++) produced some improvement.
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Figure 1: Results for the sum of Smith’s Alpha values [Smith62] at the end of each
experiment for each one of the pure configurations tested. (Note that the scores for
GMA+ are off the scale – see explanatory text for analysis.)
While the comparative values vary with the parameters applied, the results show a rel-
atively stable relationship across variations in thresholds, delta and other parameters.
As later experiments show, the reasons for the relative performance difference be-
tween of LMA over GMA is twofold: the type of information which is being learned
(and its indicator for success) and the amount/nature of agent mobility between coali-
tions which each strategy generates. Although global information on winners might be
expected to be useful information it appears that the local but pairwise information
learned by LMA agents is a stronger indicator for success.
Secondly, in GMA experiments, the decisions agents make to move are based only on
their perception of the probability of encountering (more successful) members of the
population rather than any particular judgment on their current coalition partners –
leading to a lack of motivation to leave the current coalition. This effect is best exem-
plified in the behavior of GMA+, GMA++ populations in which agents quickly form
an initial winning (but suboptimal) coalition – all members of which receive global
recognition – but which is subsequently never challenged because agents (winners or
losers) are never able to reach their decision threshold (0.2 or 0.5) to move elsewhere.
Affinity is concentrated in a small number of individuals and averages out with a uni-
form distribution of negative affinity across the remainder of the population. The fact
that agents in GMA+, GMA++ populations don’t move is the reason that performance
is even worse than a Random Strategy population, as the value of the initial coalition
is significantly smaller than the value of a bigger random coalition. Moreover, Ran-
dom strategy has the advantage of being able to discover optimal coalitions by chance
(although they will not persist over time).
As affinity for  members in  the winning coalition tends to  the  maximum, negative
affinity elsewhere flattens off – never creating a differential large enough to cause mo-
bility: essentially freezing the population in place. At GMA0, GMA- and GMA-- how-
ever mobility is assured since members of continually loosing coalitions will always
perceive more opportunities elsewhere – thus generating new sets of potential winning
coalitions as in LMA. The twin factors of the type of information learned and mobility
also suggest why for LMA 0 outperforms +/- but + and ++ outperforms – and – –, and
for GMA – outperforms +. These suggest that there may be an optimal value for LMA
somewhere between 0 and + DELTA and for  GMA somewhere between 0 and –
DELTA (or several optima):
Figure 2 illustrates a fragment of a sequence of games where a coalition of score -87
that have been together during more than 200 games and winning many of them (all
scores of -87 correspond to the same set of agents in this case) is finally broken by a
sustained sequence of better outperforming coalitions Finally, after being together 230
games,  its  members  no  longer  win  regularly  and  eventually  disband  as  another
stronger coalition establishes itself.
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Figure 2: Sequence of experiment of LMA0 pure population that shows an episode of
one coalition staying together, winning regularly and eventually being superseded.
The tradeoff between exploration and exploitation is reflected in different ways by the
two strategies:
- For LMA, agents learn indicators widely across the population as they move
(since they store information about every previous partner) – diffusing learn-
er information across the population: leading to situations where strong coali-
tions are difficult to establish (as shown below) and some resistance is bene-
ficially to temper exploration.
- For GMA information is concentrated on previous winners – leaving much of
the population relatively anonymous and biasing the system towards stability
of existing winning coalitions: indicating that more exploration is needed to
find strong combinations of agents.
4.2 Mixed Populations
A logical step onwards from pure strategy populations is study of the interactions be-
tween different strategies within the same game. Figure 3 shows a summary of the
convergence to optimal results for combinations of 50% of one strategy with 50% of
another.3 
1855.578129
1699.622303
1519.449247
1530.813052
1629.693476
1592.998302
1472.593561
1444.43691
1440.630857
1423.99606
1383.712122
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1800
LM
A0
/G
M
A0
Rd
m
/L
M
A0
Rd
m
/L
M
A+
LM
A+
/G
M
A+
LM
A-
/G
M
A-
Rd
m
/L
M
A-
LM
A+
+/
GM
A+
+
LM
A-
-/G
M
A-
-
Rd
m
/G
M
A0
Rd
m
/G
M
A-
Rd
m
/G
M
A+
S
um
 o
f 
A
lp
h
a 
V
al
ue
s
Figure 3:  Results for the sum of Smith’s Alpha values [Smith62] at the end of each
experiment for each one of the mixed configurations tested
From observing the results of convergence we can conclude that the properties ob-
served in pure populations are maintained in the hybrid populations. However, there
are a number of interesting effects: 
- A 50:50 mix of LMA0:GMA0 performs almost identically to a pure popula-
tion of LMA0 agents (the best of the pure populations).
- In general for all LMA and GMA strategies, mixing with random strategies
has very little impact on the final solution quality – coalition quality achieved
is in general only 5-10% below what a pure population may have achieved.
- Mixing with other strategies such as LMA allows even very poorly perform-
ing GMA+ and ++ strategies to perform reasonably well.
In each of these cases it is important to consider the nature of the interaction between
agents in the environment – in general both winning and loosing coalitions will con-
tain agents of both types. Hence exploratory strategies such as random shake up static
strategies such as GMA+ and allow them to function – while retaining some of their
strong  properties  (exploiting  knowledge  of  winners).  The  strong  performance  of
LMA0:GMA0 is also particularly interesting since it suggests that GMA0 agents are
either positively influenced by the dynamics generated by LMA0 or GMA0 decision
making creates similar conditions as would be found with all LMA0 agents (note that
this mix performs better than Random:LMA0 – indicating that GMA0 agents are hav-
ing a positive effect).
Furthering this comparison, Figure 3 shows that depending on the experiment either
GMA or LMA agents might get the majority of the payoff over 500 runs (and many
3 The two populations have exactly the same skills setup, hence only differing in their
strategy. 
runs are similar). Although on average LMA populations gain 37% more profit than
GMA agents when competing together, this is not a very significant advantage, and
suggests that both strategy types play a role in the good performance of this mix. 
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Figure 3: Payoff in each experiment for each Agent population having mixed LMA0
and GMA0 populations (numbers 1-20 indicate different experiment runs). 
4.3 Dynamically changing tasks
All experiments discussed up until this point used a the same task in each round of any
given 500 game run – enabling agents to learn specifically which combinations work
well for the task.  With the task varying over time however,  system dynamics also
change. Figure 4 show relative performance of GMA0 and LMA0 in environments
where the task is adapted (see Section 3) either every 10 rounds (fast change).
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Figure 4: Payoff in each experiment for each Agent population having mixed LMA0
and GMA0 populations and a Dynamic environment where each 10 games the task
changes
The results clearly show that A) as the speed of change increases the difference be-
tween the two strategies decreases and B) in the fast changing scenario GMA even be-
gins to  outperform LMA by a slight margin (although not statistically significant).
(Note that quality of solutions was also reduced but this cannot be easily measured
since the optimal coalitions change with each task - although performance is poorer
however both strategies still outperform random by a considerable margin (LMA gets
51% and GMA 20% more profit on average than Random)
Since these measures of  performance are highly dependent on specific  parameters
chosen it would be unwise to draw general conclusions. However the changes due to
dynamism do indicate: 
- As dynamism increases LMA knowledge of pairwise relationships is more
quickly eroded (made less useful) than GMA information about individuals.
- Potentially at some point LMA knowledge may become less valuable than
GMA knowledge.
- There is still value in learning event for short periods of stability such as 10
games (relative to ignoring contextual information).
An interesting deeper point here would be if it was possible to determine whether or
not at high dynamicity agents were able to learn some fundamental compatibility traits
which reflected the ability of certain subsets of agents to perform well across ranges of
tasks – rather than for just one. 
5 Contributions and Relationship to Existing Work
Coalition formation problems for economic environments have been tackled basically
from game theoretic  perspective  (pioneering  works  are  [Farrell88],[Greenberg94])
leading to the development of a wide range of techniques. Most of these techniques
however focus solving once-off coalition formation problems in which a particular set
of agents must be matched against a specific task to find one (possibly optimal) solu-
tion.4 Conversely in much of the research carried out in Agent Mediated Electronic
markets usually assumes Agents have much less knowledge about other participants
but that systems may endure over long periods of time – providing agents with many
opportunities to participate (see [Preist02] and [Faratin00] for example).
In this context, the work presented here explores how simple learning mechanisms can
be used over time to build up background knowledge in an environment and subse-
quently exploit it to make coalition decisions. The long term aim is to use this and
mechanisms of social context together with standard coalition formation problems that
tackle single instances – so that agents could exploit social relationships / knowledge
and task/skill specific knowledge. 
Although there is previous work which touches on related issues including coalition
formation and learning [Soh03], work on coalition formation through motivation and
trust [Griffiths03], and dynamic coalition formation [Klusch02, Soh02], the research
closest to that presented here are iterative coalition formation mechanisms (such as
4  This problem is known to be NP-complete in most general cases as it corresponds to a multi-
dimensional  set-covering problem with the number of states growing with the number of
agents, the number of tasks, the number of agents allowed in each coalition and the dimen-
sionality of agent and task characteristics.
[Konishi03]) and work by Shehory, Kraus and others on coalition formation in sys-
tems where little information is known about agent skills (such as [Kraus03]).
Still even in these cases work focuses primarily on single coalition formation prob-
lems and not related social context. The aim with the work presented here and a simil-
ar analysis on adaptation of game theoretic techniques such as tit-for-tat [Merida04] is
to begin looking at this wider social context that arises in iterated coalition environ-
ments – in particular: 
- How social structures accumulate or change over time 
- How social structures help or hinder both decision making (by for example
reducing the search space) and improve/decrease solution efficiency
- How decision making based on a particular coalition formation problem in-
stance (bidding for a particular tender) and the interpretation of pre-existing
social  context  (reputation,  memory, existing agreements,  partial  coalitions
and so forth) interact over time.
The factors are likely to play a significant role in the type of open dynamic trading en-
vironments envisaged in many Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce Scenarios and
may provide a useful bridge to more abstract work on social agent systems such as
work by Castelfranchi, Sichman, Conte and others on Social Power [Sichman94].
6  Discussion points 
Returning to the more limited scope of applying simple learning techniques, as de-
scribed in section 3.2, the world model, game rules and strategies described here are
very basic and leave open a range of interesting questions: 
- The results show a distinction between different dominant factors in learned
knowledge depending on task dynamism – however it is not clear whether
these are in fact redundant against one another or conflicting. 
- The dominance of information on pair wise relationships (LMA) at low rates
of change is not especially surprising, however this raises the question of
whether ternary (or larger n-ary) relationships could also be exploited.5 This
would  presumably  eventually  lead  to  diminishing  returns  and  a  storage-
space/complexity v’s gain tradeoff.
- Since learning about success/failure as used here is used as a surrogate to
working with known skill profiles of agents (which are assumed by many co-
alition formation techniques)  an interesting question is  to  what extent the
learned information mirrors skill information and whether in fact it may be
possible to infer skill information over time.
5  An example  rule  would  be  multiplying  affinities  together  for  sets  of  agents  which  had
already been in coalitions together rather than adding as is currently done.
Application of standard reinforcement learning techniques such as [Bush55] and or
adaptive changes in learning strategies (forgetting, etc.) would potentially also provide
significant improvements in performance.  More general topics of interest include: 
- Techniques such as the learning outlined here or the game theoretic approach
are approximations for actual effectiveness of any particular coalition for the
Tasks arising – raising the question of whether strict bounds can be calcu-
lated for convergence given particular world characteristics.
- Agents in current systems carry only knowledge between games, however an
important class of extensions would be those in which agents gained advant-
age or influence in proportion to their success – modelling a successful com-
pany's opportunity to invest more heavily than its competitors. This would
significantly change the dynamics of the world – potentially swinging influ-
ence back to individual rather than group success.
- The current setup assumes uniform distribution of payoff within a coalition
and no knowledge of agent skills. Relaxing these conditions would open the
way for  agents to  apply a range of  existing coalition formation strategies
within each coalition game – combining this with learned knowledge from
games over time.
- A further generalisation of the game to continuous task arrival would provide
an extra dimension of interest with agents needing to integrate considerations
of opportunity cost involving.
Each of these additional dimensions of complexity suggests that in most realistic sys-
tems; strongly suggesting that in systems of bounded rational agents exploitation of
social structures such power relations, reputation, social norms or other features  is
likely to be critical in reducing complexity explosion in decision making.
7  Conclusions
As Electronic Commerce systems evolve it seems likely not only that they will be-
come more automated but they will also increasingly take on a similar continuous/al-
ways on/iterative nature of today’s human mediated commercial systems - bringing to-
gether concerns of individual behavior, group behavior in a commercial context and
durable social structures/knowledge. 
The work presented in this paper includes a simple framework for describing iterative
economic systems in which agents must regularly perform tasks in teams or coalitions
and explores simple learning mechanisms which can be used to guide decision mak-
ing. The experiments demonstrate: 
- How simple corporate memories can be used to track global success metrics
and memory of previous joint success over time.
- How agents can use this accumulated information to both increase their own
utility and improve the quality of solutions generated by a given population. 
- How different types of knowledge (global versus local, unitary v’s binary) af-
fects outcomes.
The long term aim of the work presented here is tackle some of the issues raised in
sections 2 and 5 and analyze the interplay between decision making based on a partic-
ular coalition formation problem instance (bidding for a particular tender) and the in-
terpretation of pre-existing social context (reputation, memory, existing agreements,
partial coalitions and so forth) in any decision. 
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